Georgia Institute of Technology

Both the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) have identified certain countries of greater concern and limit certain types of transactions. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) prohibits exports and sales to certain countries under 22 CFR 126.1. It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses and other approvals (such as exmptions) for exports and imports of defense articles and defense services, to these countries. The email procedures (see the next FAQ) to check email when traveling to these countries may be different and should be reviewed by the Office of Research Integrity Assurance prior to travel. 

Both the ITAR and the EAR have listed the same countries as of 17 July 2019:
(check the ITAR 22 CFR 126.1 and the EAR Supplement No. 1 to Part 738) for the most current information)

• Afghanistan
• Belarus
• Burma
• Central African Republic
• China [PRC]
• Democratic Republic of the Congo
• Cuba
• Cyprus
• Eritrea
• Haiti
• Iran
• Iraq
• Lebanon
• Libya
• North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea)
• Somalia
• South Sudan 
• Sudan
• Syria
• Venezuela
• Zimbabwe

This guidance has recently changed and applies to all who have export controlled information.

Checking email and accessing information on cloud services while traveling internationally

Receiving or accessing export controlled information while abroad may incur export violations. If you have reason to access controlled information beyond the guidelines below, contact the Office of Research Integrity Assurance for further direction.  These guidelines will assist in avoiding export violations for any information received via email or cloud services.

Additional travel security tips are available from OIT. Travelers should check with the export office for any questions concerning this guidelines below.

Georgia Tech email and cloud services may be accessed under the following conditions:

Prior to travel:

• Purge email folders of export controlled information, especially anything controlled to your destination which includes all information covered by the ITAR.  In general, it is a good practice to use cloud options, not email, for extended storage. GT has approved cloud services available.
• Remove any email clients or any other option using IMAP/POP related to Georgia Tech from devices. These clients include Outlook, Thunderbird, etc. and may automatically download emails in violation of export regulations. Clients may remain on the devices if all connections to GT email are removed and the client is not controlled to your destination.
• Confirm you are using Office 365 for Georgia Tech email.
• Take “clean” devices (e.g. laptops, tablets, phones) that do not contain export controlled information or software.
• All devices must be encrypted. The only GT information on the devices should be necessary for the trip.
• If you are traveling to a 126.1 country, D5 country or the Russian federation, contact the Office of Research Integrity Assurance for further information.

During travel:

• Use only the web interface to check email. Mobile devices may be used to connect via webmail, if AirWatch is installed for security.
• If you receive an email which you believe contains export controlled information, do not open this email.
  • If the email is opened:
    • Make sure that no foreign nationals are able to view the information on your screen.
    • If it contains ITAR information, contact export@gatech.edu. ITAR Information accessed in a non-126.1 country is acceptable if documented appropriately.
    • If it contains EAR information and the device is not encrypted, contact the Office of Research Integrity Assurance for further information.

Exports include:

• Transfer of controlled physical items to foreign countries or to non-U.S. persons in or out of the United States
• Transfer or disclosure of information or technical data (even visual disclosure through observation) to foreign countries or non-U.S. persons in the United States or abroad
• Provision of services outside the United States or to entities outside the United States

Laws and regulations apply to items (including software, supercomputers, commodities, and technologies) as well as information. Because you, as an individual, and Georgia Tech can be held liable for improperly transferring controlled technology, review these federal regulations and contact the ORIA export review staff for additional information and assistance with specific activities.

If you answer YES to any of these questions, contact the ORIA export control staff for assistance.

Does your activity involve:

• A foreign company, whether in the United States or abroad?
• A non-U.S. person (including faculty, post-docs, students, visiting scholars, collaborators) using equipment on the Georgia Tech campus?
• A foreign government sponsor, whether conducted in the United States or abroad?
• A control with a U.S. company or the U.S. government that has a publication restriction or an associated NDA or proprietary rights agreement?
• Taking equipment out of the United States?

Do not engage in the activity until an export review has determined whether the activity is subject to control and an export license is obtained.

To request an export review, complete the Export Review Form and submit it along with a material description to the ORIA export control staff.

Several offices across campus work together to help facilitate hosting foreign visitors and guests, including: Office of International Education (OIE), Office of Human Resources (OHR), Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), Office of Research Integrity Assurance (ORIA), Office of Information Technology (OIT), and Research Security Department (RSD). All foreign visitors and guests who are not degree-seeking students enrolled at GIT must be reviewed and approved by OLA prior to receiving a letter of invitation and prior to issuance of I-20 or DS-2019 certificates.

To host a visiting scholar at GIT please complete and return the following documents to asklegal@gatech.edu:

1. Request to Host Foreign Visitors or Guest:

2. CV/Resume of Invited Guest

Global OHR and OIE will not process visa requests or invitation letters without verification that OLA has completed the export compliance review. All visiting scholars should complete a Visiting Scholar Agreement and return it to OLA. 

Under the definitions of the U.S. State Department's International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), a U.S. citizen is a U.S. Person, but a U.S. Person is not always a U.S. citizen. A U.S. Person is either:

• A citizen of the United States
• A lawful permanent resident alien of the United States (Green Card holder)
• A documented refugee or other protected political asylee

A non-U.S. Person is anyone who is not a U.S. Person. The law makes no exceptions for foreign graduate students. A non-U.S. person, also referred to as a Foreign Person, includes any foreign corporation, business association, partnership trust, society, or any other entity that is not incorporated or organized to do business in the United States. This definition includes international organizations, foreign governments, and any agency or subdivision of foreign governments (e.g., diplomatic missions).

All internaional shipments are reviewed by the Office Export Controls to ensure compliance with export regulations. Information and technology that arises from fundamental research are excluded from export regulations, but any items including samples, equipment, or prototypes are still subject to the export regulations and may require an export authorization prior to export. (An item is export if shipped or hand carried internationally.)

Contact the ORIA export control staff. This office provides assistance with:

• Research reviews
• Licensing
• Compliance
• Education

DO NOT:

• Discuss non-public domain technology with foreign companies and foreign nationals without completing an export review with the ORIA expert review staff
• Take controlled technology out of the United States without completing an export review
• Take foreign nationals on lab tours without notifying the Office of Legal Affairs

The Council on Governmental Relations has produced an excellent brochure that details the unique challenges universities face in complying with export control laws. Export Controls and Universities: Information and Case Studies includes information to help academic researchers and administrators identify how and when export control issues may arise.

A deemed export is the transfer of technology or software to a foreign national within the United States.

It takes a minimum of 60-90 days to obtain an export license. The process can take six months to a year. Remember that no transfer can occur until a license is in place. Involve the ORIA export control staff as soon as you know there may be an issue. Plan ahead to avoid problems.

Shouldn't all classified awards (contracts, delivery orders, task orders, etc...) automatically require a Technology Control Plan?

By their very nature, classified contracts offer protective measures far surpassing those required for unclassified export controlled information. The National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) specifies the following Technology Control Plan (TCP) requirements for organizations conducting classified work: A TCP is required to control access by foreign nationals assigned to, or employed by, cleared contractor facilities unless the CSA determines that procedures already in place at the contractor’s facility are adequate. The TCP shall contain procedures to control access for all export-controlled information. A sample of a TCP may be obtained from the CSA.

In the classified arena, TCPs have a much broader scope and are almost completely devoted to the organization versus the specific contract.

Most of the research at Georgia Tech qualifies for the fundamental research exclusion as defined by the National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD 189): “Fundamental Research means basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons.”

Not only does this exclusion provide for products of fundamental research to remain unrestricted, NSDD 189 further provides that, when control of information generated by federally funded, fundamental research at colleges and universities is necessitated by national security concerns, the mechanism for control is classification.

The results of projects that are conducted under the fundamental research exclusion that is, with the intent to publish the results and in the absence of any other contractual restrictions, are generally excluded from export controls.

There’s only a publication restriction. Why is my research subject to export controls?

Of all the export review conditions, publication restrictions are the most puzzling and the most common reasons for referral of projects for export review.

Not all publication restrictions are created equal. A sponsor requirement to pre-review a publication (to check for erroneously included proprietary information, for example) is a temporary delay and does not really constitute a restriction. If the sponsor will not allow publication at all, clearly that’s a restriction, as is a requirement not to publish for an extended period of time. ANY restriction of Georgia Tech’s right to publish research results removes the fundamental research exclusion.

Faculty should know that any “side agreement” with a sponsor to delay publication or to allow sponsor preapproval, also negates the fundamental research exclusion and violates Georgia Tech policy. Publication restrictions remove the fundamental research exclusion and render the project subject to export controls including both actual export and “deemed export,” which forbids sharing of certain controlled information or technologies with foreign nationals and other non-U.S. persons in the United States.

The student contributed to development of the funding proposal and is central to conduct of the project. Why does Georgia Tech now disallow his work on the project?

In most cases, DoD SBIR programs use funding authorized by Congress for system development and integration, so-called “6.3 money,” which requires that certain restrictive clauses be included in the awards. When federal Contracting Officers apply a publication restriction, such as the “7000 clause,” the project is rendered ineligible for the fundamental research exclusion from export controls. Without the exclusion, the project’s results are potentially export controlled and must be screened prior to release to any non-U.S. persons, including thesis committee members.

All seminars, poster presentations, and such may have to be cleared by the sponsoring agency and will certainly have to be screened if foreign nationals (including other students, post-docs, etc.) will be present. The program official is not responsible for publication reviews; those are reviewed by a separate DoD office. Because of these significant restrictions, students (including U.S. citizens) should not be included in proposals for such awards at all. This does not a student cannot be successful on such a project. In the event an award is made by the agency using funds that do not require restrictive publication or other export control clauses, an exception may be made at the time of the award. However, if the restrictions are included in the award, it is rare that a student would be approved to work on the project.

All Institute travel must be authorized Institute Travel Authorization Procedures. This should be completed no less than 30 days prior to all international travel. On the Travel Authority Request, list the equipment that you will need to take with you to complete the research. This request will be reviewed by Legal Affairs to assess if an export authorization is required to export the equipment lawfully. An international shipping request may also be submitted if the equipment will be shipped rather than carried by the researcher.